Can Trump Broker a Ukraine Peace?
Best outcome he can hope for is an armistice, writes Adrian Karatnycky

[“America has a positive role to play in advancing freedom and democracy in the rest of the world,” is one of the themes here at The Editors. How that will evolve in Ukraine has been a question at the top of the news lately. To understand it better, I’ve been reporting it out by soliciting, from a variety of thoughtful voices, answers to this prompt:
Trump wants to end the war in Ukraine. Is there any way for him to do it without severely setting back American interests? How? If not, what’s your proposed alternative and what are the advantages and risks or costs involved?
Today’s response—we’re working our way ahead in alphabetical order by last name—comes from Adrian Karatnycky, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and the former president of Freedom House. He is author of Battleground Ukraine: From Independence to the War with Russia (Yale: 2024). —Ira Stoll]
Donald Trump’s ambition to seek a settlement in the three-year war between Russia and Ukraine is typical of the President’s style: bold and brimming with self-confidence. But, like his controversial tariff policies, his peace gambit is far from guaranteed to succeed.
To build a durable armistice Trump needs to understand clearly Russia’s and Ukraine’s radically different societies, expectations, and ambitions.
We are now three-and-a-half decades removed from the collapse of the USSR and the emergence of a wave of post-Soviet states. And Ukraine and Russia evolved in radically different ways. Russia saw the dismantling of the major gains in personal freedoms that accompanied the end of the USSR and the uprooting of a weak new Russo-centric nation-state identity. Instead, the country saw the consolidation of a personalistic dictatorship and security state driven by a revisionist neo-imperialist ideology intent on partly undoing the dissolution of the USSR and regaining a Russian sphere of influence in Central Europe.
In Ukraine, opposite trends occurred. Its heterarchic and at times chaotic polity preserved a high degree of political freedom and a highly mobilized civil society and saw the re-emergence of a Ukrainian state built around a cohesive civic identity rooted in a distinct Ukrainian historical narrative. That state proved surprisingly resilient when it faced the stress test of all-out war.
All these fundamental differences mean that the best outcome Trump can hope for is an armistice. But an armistice will not remove the Russian threat to Ukraine nor its long-term great power ambitions. And this means that the U.S. must stay in Europe, Europe must be pressed to re-arm, and Ukraine must see significant investment in its defensive military capabilities.
Russia’s geopolitical ambitions, moreover, should not be fed by the infusion of U.S. and European capital and technologies even if the allure of the Russia market appeals to Trump’s mercantile inclinations. U.S. economic ambitions helped feed the growth of a major rival in China. There is no need to repeat this mistake.
Russian society has been radicalized and militarized. In these circumstances, and with little sign of reform currents emerging, initiatives to fuel its economy will only increase Moscow’s capacity to project malign power. It is equally a folly to believe that the U.S. can woo Russia away from China. Russia knows all too well that China’s dictatorship represents a durable and consistent partnership of strategic cooperation. Any agreements with the U.S. are full of uncertainty as they will be subject to the ebb and flow of U.S. public opinion and the rotation of power.
If President Trump takes these factors into account, and acts in concert with our Euro-Atlantic allies, he may be able to broker an end to the military phase of an exhausted Russia’s war on Ukraine. If he also understands the long-term threat Russia represents, he will be making an even more significant contribution to a safer world.
Other, earlier answers: Ukraine Is Lost. But NATO Can Rebuild and Recover, Goldman Says, by David P. Goldman.
“Partitioned, Neutral Ukraine” Could Draw Russia Away From China, Green Says, by Dominic Green.
A “Neutral” Ukraine Is a Nonstarter, Jacoby Says, by Tamar Jacoby.
If U.S. economic ambitions helped feed the growth of a major rival in China, what should we have done?
Well crafted. Complex with no obvious answers. Regardless if you like or dislike Ukraine or the rest of Western Europe what is there to like about Putin and Russia that Gabbard and others seem to see there?